Delta, An Airline That Learned From Its Mistakes - Or Has It?

It can be stated without a doubt that Delta Air Lines has seen its fair share of media attention in recent years, be it their proposed merger with Northwest, being the first US operator of Boeing’s long haul wonder the 777-200LR, being involved the JFK winter delay chaos, or its second airline-within-an-airline attempt Song. Obviously, some news were good, others were bad, just the way things happen in the business world. And no doubt, Delta has had its share of mistakes that lead to those bad news. The question is, have the people at Delta learned from the mistakes and were they able to avoid making those same mistakes again?

That’s the question I want to answer with this article. But to keep things short (at least by my standards), I will only talk about the 4 points I consider the most important ones, because if I were to analyse every single point you’d probably still be reading this article next week.

-Not using planes to their full potential:

A still fairly recent example, the year is 1999, and Delta has finally gotten their first 2 777s. Prior to the 777 arriving, the MD-11 was Delta’s choice of high-capacity long haul plane, a decision that always haunted them in that the MD-11 never performed as well as MDD promised and all too often required fuel stops on Delta’s then-longest flight Atlanta-Tokyo. So now with the 777 Delta finally had a plane for that route that could operate without the slightest risk of facing fuel-related unscheduled stops, so logic would suggest those 777s be put on ATL-NRT asap after doing a few trial flights on ATL-MCO to get the pilots used to them. Alas, that was not to happen, as instead DL chose to use their 777s on comparatively short transatlantic routes like Atlanta-Paris/London. As a result, Delta’s 777 fleet had a relatively short average airtime per frame, and the MD-11 continued to fuel-stop on the Tokyo flight, until it was finally replaced years later.

Images courtesy of Delta Airlines /Boeing

Fast forward to the year 2008, and it looks like Delta has learned well from their mistake, as their 777s are now not only flying on Delta’s longest, and supposedly also highest-yielding, long haul flights, but we also see that the average block time of the 777 fleet has significantly increased, with the 777-200ER’s having an average block time of 18 hours per day and airframe, compared to the lacking 15 hours it used to be during the initial year of operations, owed mostly to an increase in the average segment length of 777 flights. Another example of Delta better using planes to their potential is the fact that they also send their 767-300ERs on missions that really stretch their legs, with some examples being JFK-Tel Aviv/Amman at 4934nm, and the primary example being ATL-Lagos at 5078nm, one of the longest 767 flights in the world. Prior to that, Delta’s longest 763 route was ATL-Moscow, and that route was a good 400nm shorter, clearly showing how Delta is literally stretching their planes. Consider also that ATL-SVO is now flown by the 767-400ER, which is now also being used to its full range potential. Not to be outdone, November will see the start of ATL-Mumbai, which will then be the world’s longest 777 flight, operated by the 777-200LR Worldliner.

Suffice to say, Delta has learned from their mistake in this case.

- Having a too diverse fleet:

At the turn of the millennium, Delta had seemingly every US-made plane in their fleet:

727-200’s, 737-200’s, 737-300’s with old cockpits, 737300’s with glass cockpits, 737-800’s, 757-200’s, a handful of ex-SQ 757’s, 767-200’s, their own 767-300ER’s, ex-Gulf Air 767-300ER’s, 767-400ER’s, 777ss, MD-11’s, MD-88s’ and MD-90’s, a total of  6 plane families (727, 737, 757, 767, 777, MD-11, MD-8X) with a total of 15 very varying subfleets, clearly anything but a symbiotic and efficient fleet.

In the following years, in part due to 9/11, Delta reduced their fleet big time and also simplified it, leading to a fleet of 737-800’s, 757’s, a handful of ex-SQ 757’s, their own 767-300ER’s, ex-Gulf Air 767-300ER’s, 767-400ER’s, 777’s, MD-88s’ and MD-90’s, down to 4 families (737, 757/767, 777, MD-8X) and 9 subfleets. Granted, the number of subfleets has recently grown back to 12, with the 777-200LR being added, in recent weeks the 737-700, as well as the ex-AA/TWA 757’s, though neither plane meant a new family for Deltas fleet, and save for the 777-200LR’s engines, pretty much everything is common between the new types and the planes already flying for Delta. And for those wondering, I won’t include Northwest’s fleet, because as long as the deal has not been officially cleared, it doesn’t make much sense talking about what could be.

So once again, Delta has learned from their mistake. Yes, things could still be better (like elimination the ex-SQ 757’s and ex-GF 767-300ER’s to simplify the fleet), but these days other factors decide which planes will go, mainly a combination of need for the capacity, and lease contracts being up for renewal. And being that the two aforementioned subfleets are all leased, further simplification might happen sooner than we think.

- Over-dependence on Regional Jets:

It seems over the last decade, the only thing Delta CEOs wanted to do was add RJs to do everything for them:

Replace props; Replace small mainline planes like the 732; Increase frequency in small markets; Serve every little backwoods city in the US, Canada and to the South, preferably from at least 2 hubs. This all lead to Delta having one big cluster of regional operators operating pretty much every RJ over the year from the Fairchild-Dornier 328Jet over the CRJ to the E-Jets, which resulted in over 500 RJs being operated for Delta at a time, a larger fleet than even Delta’s own mainline fleet.

Thankfully, finally, this year, mostly due to high fuel prices, Delta seems to have finally seen the light with regards to RJs.

Yes, it has already been some time since they realised that 70-seat RJs, and particularly those with a First Class cabin, not only provided better economics and better customer satisfaction than the dreaded 50-seaters, but it wasn’t until this year that people at Delta realised they needed to clean up their Delta Connection cluster and both reduce overall capacity as well as the number of operators. This has resulted in Delta ending their agreement with ExpressJet, dropping Mesa/Freedom Air, dropping Chautauqua’s 37-seat ERJ-135s, and replacing 50-seat CRJs with 70/76-seat CRJ-900s, as well as retire older CRJ-100s. These moves so far will reduce Delta’s RJ fleet by around 1/4, or roughly 130 planes, as well as reduce the number of operators down to 4 (ASA/Skywest, Chautauqua/Shuttle, Comair and Pinnacle). Needless to say this is made possible by Delta dropping countless point-to-point routes, especially low-yield routes out of Florida, and reducing frequencies on quite a few other routes.

Now, one might be tempted to say Delta has again learned from their mistakes, but that’s only partially true, as Delta still hasn’t learned their lesson about operating props. Their last large props, ASA’s ATR-72s are to be gone by year’s end, leaving less than a dozen EMB-120s at Skywest, who are also scheduled to be retired in the foreseeable future, and we have yet to see Delta order a replacement prop. Obviously, with fuel being the way it is, props have undeniable advantages over RJs on a lot of short sectors, but unfortunately, it seems Delta still has not realised that, and that’s one point they still need to be criticised for.

- Not knowing how to treat an LAX hub properly:

This point right here from the start I can say is one where Delta has not learned from their mistakes, and that in a good two decades.

After the takeover of Western, Delta had 2 hubs in the Western US, namely LAX and Salt Lake City. While SLC has remained a constant force in Delta’s network, though admittedly only really seeing major growth after the de-hubbing of the DFW hub, the LAX hub saw a few highs, and even more lows. Thanks to Western, the LAX hub had a large route network on mainline planes covering most of the US as well as many cities in Canada and especially Mexico, plus a sizable regional network operated by Skywest, providing ample of feed for WA’s mainline network. You had a decent hub in one of the world’s largest aviation markets, so what do you do with it.

Build it up?

That’s what you’d expect, but alas people at Delta thought differently, and instead of for example routing their ATL-NRT-SEL flight through LAX now, they kept it at their PDX ‚hub’ (another discussion-worthy point, no doubt), and also slowly but steadily started cutting routes from their LAX hub, most notably the Mexico flights, thus over the years basically eliminating all mainline flying save for a handful of destinations in ATL, CVG, JFK, SLC, DFW, MCO, HNL, OGG, and the sole remaining international flights to MEX and GDL. Things also weren’t helped when Skywest was dropped out of LAX as a feeder, because of their focus on operating as United Express out of LAX and SFO. Routes and flights fluctuated a bit over the years, as Delta seemingly did not know what to do with their LAX hub, at one point even moving their failed PDX-Asia flights to LAX for a short while before ultimately killing all West Coast-Asia flights.

Now flash-forward to 2006, and Deltas latest (but likely not last) attempt at building up LAX. Actually, the idea thought about then wasn’t so dumb, using planes that would normally RON at East Coast cities, and have them operate East Coast – LAX – East Coast round trips, with the latter flights as red-eyes, thus getting higher usage out of your fleet as well as growing your LAX network. Only problem was that there was true feed save for their lame code share on Eagle, to help fill those planes outside of L.A.’s O&D. Feed only came in the last year, when Delta tried another major expansion from LAX in the West as well as Mexico, relying solely, of all planes, on CRJs and later ERJs. And it’s probably an undeniable rumor that most of those flights were just launched to show LAWA during Delta’s CH11 restructuring that DL needed their entire Terminal and LAWA had no base to take the gate leases away from Delta.

Granted, with regards to keeping their gate leases, the expansion actually worked, but that didn’t keep Delta from once again cutting their LAX hub to a bare-bones operation, as facilitated by a combination of high fuel prices, wrong plane types, and overall not being able to efficiently compete with the other big carriers at LAX, DL has now cut pretty much their entire Mexican operation save for GDL, as well as most single-daily transcon routes, thereby sealing another failure for Delta at LAX. And while fuel prices no doubt were a major factor in this latest failure, it can’t be denied that DL once again failed to understand the nature of the L.A. market.

Like I said, it wouldn’t surprise me to see Delta give their LAX hub yet another try fairly soon, but it remains to be seen whether they’ll then be able to avoid repeating past mistakes.

So far, they have not learned from them in this case.

C.Voss

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

Delta Airlines Analysis

(Quite why anyone would pay a ludicrous amount of money for the luxury of an on board shower when it could be better spent on hiring a private jet is of course an entirely different matter! Fractional ownership, anyone?)

On the back of a historic order placed just a few weeks ago at the Farnborough Air Show by neighbouring Abu Dhabi based Etihad Airways, the Middle East now is not just a battleground divided on religious and political grounds, but its a theatre of intense cut throat competition to both lure tourists and transit passengers to the ends of the Earth using its geographic location as a springboard to cover the globe.

All images courtesy of Emirates

Only recently EADS clinched a deal with (Abu Dhabi based) Mubadala Aerospace to supply a variety of components for new and existing Airbus airplanes. It comes as even less of a surprise that EADS has announced a potential deal with Dubai Aerospace Enterprise (DAE) to shift some manufacturing work from Europe to Dubai.

Such deals are not without their sceptics and perhaps rightfully so. There is widespread belief that the majority of these big orders won by Airbus in the Middle East are not without strings firmly attached.

“(The United Arab) Emirates owns Airbus. They don’t need a manufacturing facility in the Middle East when they have one in France,” says Doug McVitie, Managing Director at Arran Aerospace.

“This has little to do with the dollar and everything to do with their new Middle East paymasters,” he goes on to say.

Another US-based industry commentator was riled at the announcement of Emirates decision to opt for Airbus A330-300’s without so much as giving Boeing a chance to compete in the absence of an RFP, confirming a sea of change in its industrial and geopolitical strategy.

“It looks like the [Boeing] 777 was an “anomaly”; otherwise this is an Airbus airline,” he said on the condition of anonymity.

“Boeing only prevailed in cases of  clear superiority over a competing Airbus product, i.e., the 777-200LR / 777-300ER vis-a-vis the A340-500 / A340-600, or the fact that Airbus did not have a competing product, i.e., the A380-800F vs the 747-8F,“.

Teal Group’s Richard Aboulafia gave his candid opinion at the end of last years bumper “orderfest” and noted how a third of Airbus’ widebody orders lay firmly in the Middle East region.

“Mideast orders comprise 9% of Boeing’s backlog and 13% of its twin aisle backlog. But the Mideast market accounts for 19% of Airbus’s total backlog by value and an astonishing 33% of Airbus’s total twin aisle backlog,” he wrote in his newsletter published in December 2007.

Critically, of the (circa) 200 firm orders for the A380 family, 73 of those come from Emirates, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways, representing a third of the entire orderbook. (Data kindly supplied by Uresh Sheth, correct as at July 14, 2008).

The A350 too, has a heavy reliance on two of the three above named carriers. According to wikipedia, there are 477 firm orders for the A350 family, of which 227, are based on Middle East based carriers, representing over 47% of the program orderbook.

Of course, the question of European airlines staring in despair at the prospect of a tirade of flights from the Persian Gulf peninsula could ultimately lead to the death knell of some carriers. Emirates itself has made known its plans to boost its presence in Germany, much to the ire of Lufthansa.

“What exactly will the French government do when confronted with thousands of job losses at Air France-KLM or cancellation of hundreds of combined A350/A380 orders,” says the US commentator.

One source on Capitol Hill points out that the furore over Washington’s reluctance to bless the Dubai Ports World deal in 2006 is one reason for the UAE’s tacit acceptance to align itself more towards Europe for commercial reasons while placating the US politically by agreeing with the latters policies in the region.

Despite delivering Emirates first A380 on July 28th, 2008, EADS stock dropped to an intra-day low of E12.2 before closing at E12.22 (Source: Bloomberg.com).

“There is still a lot of work ahead of us,“  Airbus CEO Tom Enders said in relation to the A380 program, raising fears that the projected delivery targets for 2009 and 2010 may be revised for a second time.

Airbus’ success in the Middle East is not without merit. Having borne the wrath from (Qatar Airways CEO) Akbar Al Baker on the undefined A350XWB late last summer and soon after signing the deal at the Paris Air Show and then irking Emirates with delays to the GP7000 powered A380 by some 21 months, Airbus has ridden the waves of distress and success remarkably well.

There is little doubt that Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways will eventually induct all the airplanes that they have ordered over the last few years. The bigger question is just how hard costs will bite into their cash flows to finance these jets and also whether between the four key airports in the region (Abu Dhabi, Dubai International, Al Maktoum International and New Doha International airports) there is enough traffic to fill all those seats the three big airlines will have on offer.

Airbus’ production plans runs the inherent risk that any major deferrals by any of the three big Arab airlines will throw those plans into disarray. With Power8 being stretched out to 2012 and seeing the overall EADS workforce grow by 1% since 2007, questions over the success of the cost cutting regime while ploughing ahead to offer work to the UAE and China remain.

“Like any offset program, the China A320 line is an expensive waste of time and money,” says Aboulafia.

“Airbus is now held to ransom in China and in the Middle East - in both cases a hostage to someone else’s fortune,” McVitie says.

Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways’ hold on the A350XWB program is the one area most analysts fear Airbus’ exposure could end up being fatal. Having seen countless iterations of the ill-fated A330-derived A350, the A350XWB is not only the near two decade old response to the Boeing 777 family, Airbus also has its work cut out to prove its credentials of being able to deliver the airplane on time.

Seeing the 787 Dreamliner being delayed three times due to varying supplier, logistic and production issues, the workshare distribution on the A350XWB will equally be under the watchful gaze of the entire industry, not least because Airbus is also taking a new panel approach to building the airplane, also using composites like the 787.

Resources are starting to get stretched somewhat at Airbus - the flagship A400M still has a mountain of challenges to overcome and EADS boss Louis Gallois admitted that progress was “slower” than expected. Already running several months late with a charge of almost E900m against it, the A400M is another needless distraction for EADS as it struggles to balance a greater backlog on its commercial side with a view to meeting those order commitments whilst decreasing the size of its workforce.

The recent decision by the GAO to uphold Boeing’s protest on the USAF tanker award has only served to stifle Airbus’ ultimate aim of shifting A330 production to the United States. Given the popularity of that twinjet, the company hasn’t contemplated using its UAE partners in assembly just yet - if Northrop Grumman/EADS lose the tanker deal, the prospect of Mubadala/DAE pushing for final assembly of A330’s just as Tianjin has the A320 line, may be something Airbus gives serious consideration to. As to how that would be taken in Europe remains to be seen, although it will be a bitter pill  for Franco-German workers to swallow if such overtures are entertained.

In any direction that it turns in the Middle East, the powerhouses of Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways possess the power to turn Airbus every which way but loose. At the same time, will some of these carriers regret their alignment to Europe over the United States?

Airbus’ major wins in the region does not mean that Boeing has “lost” much, if anything. According to this order spreadsheet, Boeing has also secured some sizeable orders too. (Data kindly supplied by Uresh Sheth, correct as at July 14, 2008).

Only time will tell whether Airbus comes good on the A350XWB, and we have three big carriers all waiting on the sidelines watching closely too.

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

Every Which Way But Loose

While discussing first quarter results in which fuel costs have risen by 49%, the carriers profits nosedived over 85% to just £37m.

Earlier on this week, low fares rival Ryanair also posted abysmal results.

“We have ordered six new Boeing 777-300ER aircraft for delivery beginning in 2010. They are 23 per cent more fuel efficient than the Boeing 747-400 and give us additional flexibility in the longhaul fleet,” says CEO Willie Walsh.

Surprising is the absence of reference to any potential order for the A350-1000, which despite being the largest Airbus twinjet, is still smaller than the 777-300ER and not available until 2015 or beyond at the earliest. BA’s decision may have partly been influenced by the inherent success of the 777-300ER and also the favourable 2010 slots, just a year after it takes delivery of 4 Boeing 777-200ER’s (2009).

Images copyright/owned by FleetBuzz Editorial.com

As opined several months ago, the decision to select the 777-300ER is one that BA could ill afford to miss out on. It could have chosen to wait for the A350-1000 yet miss out on lucrative cost savings on the 777-300ER, which still has the advantage of being able to haul at least an extra 6 tons of freight (based on Emirates configurations/mission rules).

BA’s reliance on underbelly freight capacity would have taken a major hit with the A350-1000, and while the said airplane itself struggles to overcome weight and range issues, BA’s selection of the class winning 777-300ER was almost a “foregone” conclusion. Just looking at BA’s figures today, it reported a jump of 21% in cargo revenue - nothing to be snubbed in a climate of high competition and rising fuel costs, which the carrier cites as being the equivalent of £8m a day.

Qantas too had been eyeing the 777-300ER in the wake of the 787 delays and as an alternative 350-seater to fly selected Pacific-Rim routes. Given BA’s early slots for the type, and the recent management change at Qantas, we may yet see the Australian carrier buy the big Boeing twin, although there is no guarantee that it could get similar delivery slots.

Willie Walsh had mentioned previously the “flexibility” he had for airplane orders, particularly since BA too is on standby while the 787 has yet to be delivered. It may well appear that BA’s relationship with GE may also be on the mend. Should we expect to see a 747-8I order?

It’s a distinct possibility given that BA had no choice in the engine selection of the 777-300ER.  As the airline prepares to phase out some of its oldest 747-400’s and with a projected service entry of 2010 for the 747-8I, Boeing still has an outside chance to fill the void beneath the airlines A380-800’s (due for delivery in 2012) and its 777-300ER fleet.

Pending a merger with oneworld partner, Iberia, the likelihood of the Spanish carriers A340’s being dropped in favour of more 777’s and 787’s becomes more attractive to maximise the operational and fleet synergies between the two going forward.

“The combined balance sheet, anticipated synergies and network fit between the airlines make a merger an attractive proposition, particularly in the current economic environment,” says Walsh.

In sticking with its policy of not opting to be a launch customer, BA may yet order the A350-1000. However, now that the 777-300ER has finally found a way into the fleet setup, the prospects of BA buying more 777’s (and 787’s) instead of A350’s increases.

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

British Airways Selects 777-300ER

Lufthansa has been stifled by unions going on strike over pay, while Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary stands firmly resolute that the carrier would not be introducing fuel surcharges and would continue, where possible to reduce fares.

 Image courtesy of Boeing

“Whatever the causes and whatever the likely effects of the current airline industry problems might be our view can is that if Ryanair is to survive through this current crisis fully intact it needs to take drastic price increase measures combined with severe capacity cut action now.

So what should it do?

For a start management needs to climb off the high and mighty pedestal and accept that nothing short of at least a doubling of ticket prices will suffice.

Secondly, instead of talking this crisis down as an opportunity for Ryanair to gain as more and more smaller airlines across the world go bust it must accept that as long as the price of oil remains at anywhere near current levels that absolutely no one will gain.

Thirdly, instead of telling its already battered shareholders that it will take near twenty planes out of service for the short winter period it will take out nearer 50 to 60 planes out for as long as the crisis demands.

Fourthly, Ryanair must now make a humiliating admission – that the growth strategy is shattered and now completely wrong and that, having ordered far too many new Boeing planes, that it intends to now renegotiate,” says BGC Partners strategist, Howard Wheeldon.

With this is mind, British Airways and Iberia will be looking to get the benefit of operational synergies across their mainline fleets and lower their costs while being able to adjust capacity to demand as both carriers tackle rising fuel costs.

 Image courtesy of oneworld

Given the relative ease with which EU regulators cleared the merger between Air France and KLM, there should be no plausible reason to prohibit a merger between the two carriers. Indeed, even if talks come to nothing and BA elects to restart talks with American Airlines, again, under the new Open Skies regime, the EU authorities have little ammunition with which to stop such desires.

As usual, the bungling words of discord from Sir Richard Branson and his Virgin Atlantic over British Airways’ merger ambitions does little to hide the inept performance of his own airline, 49% of which is held by Singapore Airlines which it is desperate to offload. Equally, Branson voiced almost no fears of a disadvantage at Heathrow when Air France started operations to Los Angeles, yet is hypocritically quick to shoot the first arrow into virtually anything British Airways does when it looks to consolidate its operations.

In short, Ryanair’s dismal results highlights the pressing need for a major overhaul in Europe.

“The aviation landscape is changing and airline consolidation is long overdue,” says BA CEO, Willie Walsh.

Perhaps the biggest question isn’t whether regulators will hinder mergers, but rather, whether the airlines themselves acknowledge that destiny is in their own hands and they need to do something about it to survive.

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

Europes Differing Flightpaths

Consolidation of the Indian market is still largely an ongoing episode, with the most recent overtures by Kingfisher Airlines towards its smaller domestic rival, SpiceJet being rebuffed after the $80m injected by Wilbur Ross to thwart Dr. Vijay Mallya’s plans.

SpiceJet itself is struggling to cope with the rise of fuel and is in talks to defer delivery of some if its Boeing 737’s. Kingfisher too is widely rumoured to be in negotiations to defer deliveries of up to 29 Airbus A320’s as demand wanes on India’s domestic network, gripped by higher fuel surcharges and the scrapping of a plethora of flights by most airlines in the country.

Image courtesy of Boeing

“I like to do good deals and I won’t do expensive deals,” says Mallya, yet almost laughably the carrier is struggling to find buyers for two new Airbus A340-500’s that are now seemingly “surplus to requirement”.

With the evolution of point-to-point travel, the emergence of twin engine airplanes now being the benchmark for long haul travel, Kingfishers selection of the A340 is certainly one that it is hard pressed to admit it got wrong, not least because the said A340-500, like the 777-200LR are niche market players and have limited demand. The inferior and higher fuel burn of the A340-500 further complicates the reasoning for the purchase, although some insiders say that Kingfisher picked up the A340’s for around $90m apiece.

Cheap to acquire, expensive to operate it seems given the business climate in India today.

Air India and Jet Airways may be poised to better weather the storm given the delays to the 787 that both have ordered, while benefiting from operating the popular and in-demand 777-300ER between various hubs in their already established networks in Europe and beyond.

Image courtesy of Tim Dauber

Interestingly, as the economic slowdown grips India, the shift towards using other modes of cheaper transport has a dramatic effect on air travel.

Boeing Commercial Airplanes Vice President, Sales, South & Southeast Asia, Dr. Dinesh A. Keskar sums up the situation quite succinctly:

“Airlines have increased fuel surcharges and when you do that, sure, you’ll get a little bit more revenue but you also see numbers of passengers going down as there are a few people at the end of the pyramid now who say “yeah, I can travel but I better go on the train again“, “.

While the summer season reaches a peak, the uncertainty over fuel, confidence in the marketplace being able to bounce back remains. Just last week Boeing upped its 20 year forecast for India and Airbus’ 2007 Global Market Forecast is equally upbeat about the region:

“India and China are evolving into vibrant marketplaces with a dynamic consumer base, which is expected to become three times larger than that of North America and Europe combined, by 2026. In time, the influx of these new consumers from emerging countries will prove crucial to the world economy, as private consumption in developed countries reduces. With levels of consumerism set to ease in developed regions, the world economy will increasingly rely on China and India as an alternative source of demand.” 

On the face of it, this Indian summer may just be a blot of discontent while fuel cost uncertainty pushes the populace away from air travel.

The battle for domestic and international dominance will be decided largely by those airlines who stand out in the summer heat and make some drastic fleet and network changes to benefit themselves if they aim to pluck passengers off trains and into the skies. It’s no easy feat, but so much untapped market potential exists in India that the reward for prudence is one that is too good to miss.

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

Indian Summer

 Image courtesy of the BBC/AP

 Image courtesy of CNN/Manila Airport

The story will no doubt be unfolding in the coming days, however, the images are pretty dramatic and it’s fortunate that a potentially bigger catastophe has been avoided.

“It was like a bomb going off … then there was a wind rush through the plane … and then the oxygen masks dropped.”

 Image courtesy of ninemsn

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has classified the incident as serious and investigations have already begun into finding the cause.

Excerpt from the BBC:

 Passenger Olivia Lucas told the BBC said everyone was “pretty scared for a few moments”.

“Then everyone focused on getting their oxygen masks on,” she said. “Everyone was calm and quiet and there was notable relief when we landed. Everyone applauded the pilot.”

Image courtesy of SMH

“We are very lucky we landed safely and no-one was hurt.”

The airplane involved is VH-OJK, MSN 25067. The Sydney Morning Herald has some more dramatic images here.

©2008 . All Rights Reserved.

Post from:

Qantas 747-400 In Emergency Landing