After The Delay
June 29th, 2009
From research notes to blog talk, east to west, south to north - the delay in the 787’s first flight drew out an array of thoughts on the matter.
While the delay in itself is rather untimely given that assurances were made that the first example would fly by the end of the second quarter, the pressure to commit to a second production line plays heavily on the decision to incorporate a permanent structural fix to the upper wing root area that didn’t handle stresses as per the modelling.
The chorus of words demanding management change overlook the fact that any new seniority still faces the same technical issues as before. Of course, the concern after the conference call last week was the omission of any new timetable. That could be interpreted as perhaps maybe a revision in a minor way so as not to stretch out flight testing beyond the second quarter of next year, or indeed a complete detailed schedule cannot be provided until testing on the structural area yields some quantitative results.
For the 787, its two key stumbling blocks thus far have been the incorporation of radical new technology, never before used on such a wide-ranging single family application and secondly the distribution of the work amongst partners dotted across the globe.
ANA Boeing 787-8
Image courtesy of All Nippon Airways / Boeing
Customers such as Qantas that have now vacated some of their slots presents an opportunity for other customers waiting farther down the 787 delivery chain to possibly negotiate earlier deliveries. For launch customer All Nippon Airways, traffic in Japan and the region has been hit hard, exemplified by its national rival, Japan Airlines, having to seek out a hefty bail out loan while it restructures.
Where Boeing will want to forget this week as it races to start the next one - questions surrounding the ability of its international supplier partners being able to incorporate this new patch to the 787 and aim to increase production with minimal revenue in the short term will create added pressure - particularly since the 787 distribution chain as well as production have yet to reach a level of “normalcy”.
Critically, these vacated 787 slots will be much sought after and could for the time being, mean Boeing does not have to put too much thought into a second line anytime soon. The balance ultimately lies in whether the supply partners can ramp up production to meet the goals of the Everett final assembly line or whether they risk parting with capital to yet further raise component manufacture for a second line when the first is not even close to being maximised.
With service entry almost inevitably now delayed yet further, aside from being able to build and deliver 787’s faster with a second line, the issue of revenue surges with importance. Until an updated schedule emerges, it’s impossible to speculate on what, if any number of 787’s can be delivered next year. Boeing’s cash position will take a hit with yet further compensation costs and perhaps a second line can alleviate the longer term production issue of delivery of the backlog. The costs of doing so are huge and we may yet see Vought being taken out of the 787 equation altogether, albeit the costs of not doing so are even greater. Add in to the mix other product development studies, and you quickly get to a situation where such decisions will be made sooner, not later.
Laughably, a few proletarians suggest that there’ll be some “imminent demise” of Boeing without considering it doesn’t just sell the 787 when it comes to money. A few other one-dimensionalists, in a show of blinkered inappropriateness, appear fixated on “credibility”, thereby undermining what little of their own they (might) still have despite their limited outlook. Yet by the same token, such critics embrace disbursement from EU taxpayers and still fail to condemn EADS for its antics in seeking aid for the A350XWB program - that on top of the untold sums that are still being ploughed into the A380.
“It’s a matter for the politicians,” said Airbus’ John Leahy at the recent Paris Air Show.
Well, actually its not.
If EADS didn’t need to ask for aid while warming an ~8bn Euro nest egg for “US acquisitions” that will likely never materialise, the politicians have nothing to discuss!
That aside - Airbus stands to gain very little from Boeing’s woes. With its own A330 order book bulging and the A350XWB block-booked until 2016, many carriers with orders for those types as well as the 787 will have to endure a waiting game - not least because yields and traffic are still searching for the seabed before they can even consider rising to the surface.
In the mish-mash of surface-depth doom mongers, the industry downturn may just be the saving grace for the 787 despite its delays as customers seek to reshuffle their businesses and their fleet procurements.
Every coin has two sides - it’s not all bad news.
Entry Filed under: Boeing, Boeing 737-700, Boeing 737-800, Boeing 737-900ER, Boeing 737NG, Boeing 747, Boeing 747-8 Intercontinental, Boeing 747-8F, Boeing 747-8I, Boeing 767, Boeing 777, Boeing 777-200LR, Boeing 777-300ER, Boeing 777F, Boeing 787, Boeing 787 Dreamliner, Boeing 787-3, Boeing 787-8, Boeing 787-9, Boeing Commercial Airplanes
39 Comments Add your own
1. ikkeman | June 29th, 2009 at 08:24
So it’s actually a good thing, that those pestky customers finally relinquish that untoward pressure on Boeing, demanding their orders be filled as per their contract…
Come on, Boeing is going through real pains right now. In my personal opinion, it’s never a good idea to forget a bad week - it’s one of the most lucrative learning oppertunities.
Every coin has two sides - on is not as pretty as the other.
2. Steve | June 29th, 2009 at 09:20
Funny how every delay and order cancellation is a good thing for Boeing. Using that logic, an infinite delay and loss of all 787 orders would be great news for Boeing.
Those rose-tinted specs must be really good!
Talk of a second production line before Boeing has even been able to finish one 787 is simply laughable. The partners have been warning that raising production rates above 7/month will be a huge (and expensive) task = they can’t/don’t want to do it.
It’s also laughable to suggest that QF’s cancellation of 15 787s miraculously frees up some delivery slots - it might have if 787s were being built, but the latest (still undetermined delay) will wipe out more that the 15 that QF binned. So how does anyone get their 787s earlier?
By the way, don’t know if the news has filtered out yet, but it seems that Boeing has a minor issue with the 748 keel beam - it doesn’t fit. :-O
@ ikkeman, Agreed, after the week from hell for Boeing, their coin has “ugly” on one side and “damned ugly” on the other.
3. Vero Venia | June 29th, 2009 at 10:02
The situation is not good for Boeing. There is no doubt about it.
I have always been persuaded that composite structure was not the issue in the 787 program. I was expecting most troubles to be on the systems and software side. So, I was wrong.
This structural issue came as a very-very big surprise for me, especially when you have worked in advanced finite element analysis department. There are hundreds of papers dealing with stiffened composite panel failure modes.
It looks like the design has been done by a second or third tier engineering firm who had not all the required information to do a proper design work. I am not saying that those people are not competent, but design requirement details might have been lost in the information-chain between Boeing and the last-level engineering supplier.
Now, I am a little bit curious about the aeroelastic response of the aircraft. It seems that the wings are more flexible than anticipated because the deflection has been more than the prediction when they detected the structural issue. I think the first vibration modes are at lower frequencies than expected. I wonder where the flutter speed is.
On the positive side, they can utilise this delay to guarantee the maturity of the aircraft in areas like systems and software.
And yes, I agree with Fleetbuzz Editorial that this severe crisis relieves the pressure on the 787.
4. george james | June 29th, 2009 at 12:38
It’s clear Boeing does not understand the dynamics associated with composites in this application. Their modeling has fallen way-short of reality, which the FAA will take due notice since Boeing expects their models to prove to the FAA that the A/C is structurally sound. the FAA should no longer trust Boeing’s simulation data and should demand actually physical testing on virtually everything associated with the composites.
Also, structural faults detected far short of the 150% ultimate load suggest the fix will have to be extensive in order to provide margin for the final ultimate load test. How much more overweight will that make the 787, resulting in it’s imability to meet range and capacity specs.
The chances are increasing that the 787 will never make it into service, either due to ongoing technical problems, massive order cancellations, or FAA never being satisfied - or some combination.
5. Stacy | June 29th, 2009 at 13:41
Jon - do you know what parts of the static frame will have to be replaced entirely since they are now damaged? If they need new wings with a new design, that seems like a major delay.
Won’t they have to replace the same parts on the fatique frame for the fatigue test data to actually be valid?
6. keesje | June 29th, 2009 at 13:50
I hope George James is wrong. When the project started my major concerns were certification of the composites structure and operational damage assesment / repairs.
The sixth or seventh delay will probably be a result of Boeing and the FAA sitting around the table and agree on a realistic, conservative flight test program and certification schedule. Not the “ambitious” stuff Boeing as a patent on.
And when will we at last stop taking Boeing press releases / interviews as a reference to see if other media / people are correct? I’m surprised to see how many still do, while having hit the wall so often in a short period.
7. ikkeman | June 29th, 2009 at 14:34
3. Vero Venia | June 29th, 2009 at 10:02
but how many of those papers deal with the specific combination of fibre and matrix used by Bo, how many deal with the precise production parameters and how many are valid for the geometry/load application.
Don’t forget Bo started this design more than half a decade ago without mature material properties.
Reality has a nasty habit of not conforming to FEM results, even if you use semi correct PCOMP material cards insted of just a quasi-isotropic ones…
Do agree with your final line.
4. george james | June 29th, 2009 at 12:38
you serious on your last paragraph???
6. keesje | June 29th, 2009 at 13:50
that reminds me, we haven’t yet heard anything on the structural repair manual - does anyone know whether the FAA has seen anything on that, or has commented???
8. Mike M | June 29th, 2009 at 14:46
>>>Funny how every delay and order cancellation is a good thing for Boeing.
It is, because it gives them breathing space to sort out the fuck-ups theyve been making. Although it will end up costing term in delayed/compensation payments
>>>Using that logic, an infinite delay and loss of all 787 orders would be great news for Boeing.
Now thats just plain stupid.
9. Dougloid | June 29th, 2009 at 16:05
The real question is how serious is this delay and what is the real reason for it. I have not yet heard anything but speculation.
10. Vero Venia | June 29th, 2009 at 16:34
Boeing Looking at Second 787 Line
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw062209p2.xml
This is quite interesting considering the last postponement decision. Let’s assume that this is true, then it raises several interesting questions.
Several suppliers stated that their facilities could produce at a rate up to 7 units per month. The final assembly line can also deal with this number. If there are two assembly lines, then the suppliers have to invest in order to cope with the required number.
If 787 suppliers invest, Boeing might ask them to invest on production means that are compatible with a possible 777 enhancement or replacement.
In the next 24 months, it will be interesting to track all possible discussions between Boeing and its suppliers. If there are signs that the required investment is beyond the need for 150 787 per year then it is likely that the 777 enhancement or replacement is in the pipe.
11. boeing investor | June 29th, 2009 at 16:46
Vero Venia - I would HOPE that Boeing decide to build any 777 replacement IN-HOUSE and NOT have to pressurize 787 suppliers.
This latest 787 delay is, a disaster - had Carson kept his trap shut, this delay wouldnt have been half as bad.
Fly by the end of the month my ass.
12. Steve | June 29th, 2009 at 17:37
“It is, because it gives them breathing space to sort out the fuck-ups theyve been making.”
Every delay cost them huge $$$s in additional work and defers income that their business plan was built around (hence the stock price going down the pan). Compensation payments should be capped in the sales contracts, so further delays won’t cost any more for already impacted airlines, but additional delays will add more airlines to the list qualifying for compensation.
Every cancellation is revenue lost. Again this impacts projected future earnings that the stock price is based on. 63 cancellations so far this year has easily lost Boeing over $6bn revenue. Gone.
But it’s all good?
13. Vero Venia | June 29th, 2009 at 18:45
Not with the Sword of Damocles above the head.
How can they remove the risk of strike?
14. B380 | June 29th, 2009 at 21:37
Where is Dougie? I would love to see how he will be ripping Boeing to shreds over this new delay….
“these vacated 787 slots will be much sought after”
ohh yeah, airlines will be killing themselves over these slots.
“the balance ultimately lies in whether the supply partners can ramp up production to meet the goals of the Everett final assembly line”
Ohh please, let ONE aircraft fly for a start before we get to the ramp ups and the second assembly lines.
…then my favourite…. into the article about the 787, additional delays, cancellations…. bring in EU taxpayers, A350, A380, Leahy and EADS.
“Every coin has two sides - it’s not all bad news.”
Of course not, we are all alive at least. That’s a bit of good news.
3. Vero Venia | June 29th, 2009 at 10:02
Vero, not only does it come as a surprise but can anybody be confident that it is the only design problem Boeing have at this point? I don’t think you will find anyone. I am beginning to think that Boeing (and Airbus for that matter) may not be fully capable, for now, to understand the composite behaviour for the primary structures, like wing and fuselage. As a passenger, this development, doesn’t give me a lot of confidence.
4. george james | June 29th, 2009 at 12:38
“The chances are increasing that the 787 will never make it into service”
That is a pretty bold statement… If that were the case, it would spell trouble for the whole of the aerospace industry.
9. Dougloid | June 29th, 2009 at 16:05
That is the X billion $ question.
15. Mike M | June 29th, 2009 at 21:43
>>>Every delay cost them huge $$$s in additional work and defers income
Thats an assumption since most of these launch customers will have secured significant discounts - not to mention, that after the first couple of delays, Boeing will have renegotiated contracts factoring in compensation consumate to subsequent delays.
Of course we can all guess, but the costs are indeed high.
>>>>63 cancellations so far this year has easily lost Boeing over $6bn revenue. Gone.
Considering aside from deposits, Boeing wont have seen a dime of that money - so it revenue it could have had but it is certainly NOT lost as it never HAD it in the first place
16. Steve | June 29th, 2009 at 23:49
<b.”Thats an assumption since most of these launch customers will have secured significant discounts - not to mention, that after the first couple of delays, Boeing will have renegotiated contracts factoring in compensation consumate to subsequent delays.
“
You’re missing the point completely - all this rework and additional work that Boeing has to do is costing them $billions. I’m not talking about compensation for the airlines, every delay costs Boeing LOTS of $$$s - or do you think all the worker bees doing unproductive work are doing it for free? The assembly line that should have been pumping out 787s for over a year is doing nothing productive - it’s not generating any income and is costing $$$s to man and run every day.
Think about what they need to do to fix the latest cock-up - fixes have to be developed, modelled, then tested. If it’s not 100%, start again. That all costs big bucks and it’s money that Boeing hadn’t planned on spending.
Here’s a shocker for you -
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw062909p1.xml
“Boeing has not revealed the 787’s development cost. Previous delays pushed it to $15-20 billion for all partners, according to some analysts’ estimates. Carson says it is too early to say how much this latest delay will add to that figure.”
IIRC, the original estimate of 787 development costs was $10bn.
“Considering aside from deposits, Boeing wont have seen a dime of that money - so it revenue it could have had but it is certainly NOT lost as it never HAD it in the first place”
From your response you don’t seem to know much about how big company finances work. Boeing has lost that future revenue that was factored in to all their financial forecasts and which drives their stock price. It’s $6bn that they had previously counted on earning and have now lost. It’s gone.
Cancellations and delays - why do you think the stock price has been hammered? Extra costs for Boeing and lost revenue. Anyone trying to paint this picture as anything less than bad is deluding themselves.
17. Dougloid | June 30th, 2009 at 02:16
Considering aside from deposits, Boeing wont have seen a dime of that money - so it revenue it could have had but it is certainly NOT lost as it never HAD it in the first place
That’s not true, Mike. As long lead items are received in and as the aircraft take shape progress payments are made. Some items may be more than 3 years lead time. Someone’s got to front the money for that stuff, and if the customer is the one putting in some dollars they’re a lot less likely to cut the string. See, Boeing and Airbus don’t want people cancelling their orders without a damn good reason and some pain in the bargain.
Move a line position? Get a check. That’s how it’s done in the aircraft or shipbuilding business.
18. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 07:10
14. B380 | June 29th, 2009 at 21:37
No, they won’t be fighting for those slots to death. But those slots will be taken quickly. As I pointed out in the following comment in Randy’s blog, there are many mid-sized jets to be replaced in the next 20 years.
http://boeingblogs.com/randy/archives/2009/06/first_flight_postponed.html#comment-55806
Boeing sized the 787-8 and 787-9 small enough to fulfill this replacement market.
The 787-8 can fly the distance of more than 90% of existing routes. Interestingly, there isn’t any other aircraft with the 787-8 size in the next 10 years.
If Boeing manages to solve all the initial issues of the 787, there is no doubt this program will be a success.
19. ikkeman | June 30th, 2009 at 07:24
at $20.000.000.000,00 the top end of the 787 cost range is the same as the lower end of the 380 estimate… I know it’s alotta new, but it’s also alotta smaller.
What are both these numbers based on - just hearsay?
20. Leelaw | June 30th, 2009 at 07:35
Seems like a lot longer than a mere two years ago that Mike Bair was spinning the yarn of “1000 temporary fasteners” being the greatest challenge facing the 787 program . BTW, is there a healthy supply of fasteners these days?
21. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 08:08
19. ikkeman | June 30th, 2009 at 07:24
Is it important to know how much the 787 program or the A380 program cost to the manufacturers?
As long as they can make enough operating profit every year, I don’t see the reason why you should be interested by those numbers. The details on how they spread the cost all along the life of the program are interesting only for accountants.
22. JayPee | June 30th, 2009 at 08:13
Ikkeman, that is $20 billion laid out before first flight has even occurred. There is still the whole flight test program plus the industrialization. What happens if Boeing stumbles on the customization, as Airbus did?
I don’t want to beat on Boeing but some people on this forum don’t want to accept anything other than what Boeing says. If Boeing was wrong, it appears just to be a case of them being “malquoted” and such documents will be “rectified”. How many times does Boeing have to obfuscate, dance around the truth, not come completely clean or downright lie (or show total incompetence for those who believe Carson did not know the “true” situation of the 787 status while making grand announcements/predicitons at one of the most significant industry events of the year) before some people here decide to show just a little bit of skepticism towards Boeings statements?
Another point. Boeing has risk sharing partners on this program. Would that not mean that once the 787s start getting delivered, won’t Boeing have to split the income from each of these aircraft? So on top of all the money they have laid out (in the interest of saving development costs) comes the hit that it will only come back at a fraction of the rate it would have, were Boeing without risk sharing partners.
23. Mike M | June 30th, 2009 at 14:34
>>>From your response you don’t seem to know much about how big company finances work.
Not “strictly” true
>>>Boeing has lost that future revenue that was factored in to all their financial forecasts and which drives their stock price.
Which coincided with what I said that it was revenue they never HAD in the first place. I dont disagree that it drives share price etc, however, even investors will know that such outstanding monies, including as Mr Dougloid said about PDP’s, that money doesnt materialize until delivery (the buld of it anyway).
24. ikkeman | June 30th, 2009 at 15:34
21. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 08:08
i’m interested in those numbers both to validfate them against each other, and as an indication of the amount of effort put into both developments.
22. JayPee | June 30th, 2009 at 08:13
the cost is shared more than the income (gotta love that foreign state aid) So (IMHO) Bo would profit more than it’s risk sharing partners.
25. Falcon | June 30th, 2009 at 15:46
Ikkeman,
Is there any published information as to how the revenue is shared compared to cost?
26. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 16:02
Very interesting endeavor but not very useful.
27. Guru Josh | June 30th, 2009 at 16:36
VeroVenia: “I was expecting most troubles to be on the systems and software side. So, I was wrong.”
Don’t judge til the day is over.
With regard to penalty payments: It is safe to assume 10,000-20,000 $ per day per airframe, with the first 3-6 months for free and a cap anywhere between 10-20% of contract price. You can work out your own best/worst case scenario from that.
28. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 17:09
To ikkeman
Don’t get me wrong. When I said, “Very interesting endeavor but not very useful.” i meant that it was not useful if you can’t compare the cost with the long term profit generated by the product.
One dollar investment is always too expensive if you don’t get any return on it.
An investment of one billion dollars is interesting if you get two hundred million dollars of annual profit during twenty years.
29. ikkeman | July 1st, 2009 at 06:50
28. Vero Venia | June 30th, 2009 at 17:09
I’m not interested in it for financial reasons, ROI or any of that… I’m interested in how much effort these birds took to take off.
In the end, aviation is not a cost based economic activity. The major players have their sponsors who will make sure that whatever happens, the Duopoly will survive. Bo will not be allowed to stop their BCA activities (though it could always sell) and Ab will never be allowed to go bankrupt (however much debt it racked up to equal the world leader in less than 30 years)
30. Vero Venia | July 1st, 2009 at 08:14
29. ikkeman | July 1st, 2009 at 06:50
Understood.
But then you won’t have any conclusion and what you do becomes absolutely useless. The most interesting question is always, “Why do you do an effort?”
I don’t think a company invests just for fun.
29. ikkeman | July 1st, 2009 at 06:50
There is a very interesting concept called anti-trust law or competition law. By law, there won’t be any monopoly in big commercial airplane manufacturing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antitrust
31. Falcon | July 1st, 2009 at 12:43
There is a very interesting concept called anti-trust law or competition law. By law, there won’t be any monopoly in big commercial airplane manufacturing.
Vero Venia
I’m sorry Vero Venia but the anti-trust law does not prevent monopolies. There is absolutely nothing stopping a monopoly from existing in US and your suggestion that this law will prevent a monopoly in big commercial airplane manufacturing is unfortunately a gross misunderstanding of what this law does.
What the antitrust law does is a) Prevent a company with dominating position from abusing its competition. This should allow new entrants but unfortunately doesn’t always work as we have seen with small airlines trying to enter a route just to be strangled by the existing dominant airline.
b) Prevent agreements between companies that restrict competition. This is why you often see statements that mergers and JVs await approval.
There is nothing preventing a monopoly to form because it is the only remaining company in a segment where all other competitors folded “by their own” and there is no requirement for two companies to establish at the same time in a new segment so there can legally be a monopoly in big commercial airplane manufacturing.
32. ikkeman | July 1st, 2009 at 16:18
30. Vero Venia | July 1st, 2009 at 08:14
before the why must come the what - what did you do,
Boeing is the only large commercial airframe integrator in the US - it is therefore a monopoly in the US.
33. mikej | July 1st, 2009 at 20:08
This latest snafu has me wondering if the entire 787 program wasn’t really intended to be swindle from the get-go… after all the Board approved every action thus far. Maybe they really were doing a swindle while making it “look like” honest mistakes. Thats how Enron and Madoff did it. And the US Government does it everyday. (ie: too insidious to merely be “mistakes”)
Or maybe I’m wrong and BCA are merely idiots… but if they’re merely idiots why are the in charge of building airliners that people have to fly in?
Even so, I’ve read the word “credibility” a few times above, Boeing is lacking serious credibility on this entire 787 program. Even IF it flies, would I trust them? NO! What else did they miss?!?
So good-guys like Shanahan get stuck holding the bag trying to fix a swindle.
I heard ZA001 wing-sob-joint has fatigue/cracking problems just from vibrations of engine run-ups… Big-B Management is afraid the wings might fall off just from this, leave alone taxi tests.
Also every 787 thus far sitting in the Final Assembly bay, the center wing stub-sob-joint has buckling problems just with the weight of the wings as they sit on their wheels (with no flying loads).
They grossly underestimated the loads on the center wing-stub/side-of-body-join areas.
I’ve heard that the 777 originally had similar sob developemental problems, which got fixed/redesigned… yet then how come they got it wrong AGAIN on 787?
Answer: at the beginnning of 787, BCA Management would NOT listen to reason, and threw away ALL lessons-learned.
34. Jacobin777 | July 1st, 2009 at 22:43
mikej:
This latest snafu has me wondering if the entire 787 program wasn’t really intended to be swindle from the get-go
It will be the end of Boeing if that were true. I just think its been a huge mess up.
35. ikkeman | July 2nd, 2009 at 07:54
and I think management has a hard time coming to grips with the realities of large and complex engineering projects like this. Problem is, it’s unlike any other industry. Low production numbers, high complexity and immense regulations make aviation a hard business to get inline with new managemetn techniques.
36. Vero Venia | July 2nd, 2009 at 08:44
32. ikkeman | July 1st, 2009 at 16:18
I didn’t know that US airlines could not buy Airbus products.
37. mikej | July 3rd, 2009 at 03:15
The “intended swindle” theory is just a theory… make one pause to wonder though.
There were rumors and wispers of this sob-center-structure fatigue buckling problem over a year ago… they were trying to solve it the whole time, but couldn’t… it turns out that it really is just a few areas need reinforcing… which still means designing and fabricating and installing parts, which will take some time…
It’s what they (BMA) get for too much outsourcing, and too much dreaming with no reality-checks… until reality forced its way in.
Oh well huh…
38. Jerry1t | July 7th, 2009 at 21:09
Is there any chance that the fix for this problem is a simple one and the skeptics above think that lessons that were learned were forgotten but, in truth, will add to the solution.
Until there is some definitive information regarding the time schedule, alot of the above comments are just arm chair technologists who may or may not really understand what happened.
I hope we will be surprised and Boeing will come forth with a solution that will get this plane up in the air quickly and safely.
39. boeing investor | July 7th, 2009 at 21:13
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/50145437.html
Seems the wing issue has not stopped taxi tests.
I hope a fix is announced soon so it can fly.
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