Tanker Travails (Part Two)

Following on from last weeks GAO decision to rule in favour of Boeing for the US Air Force tanker contest, today’s YouTalk entry is kindly supplied by Aurora (member from FleetBuzz.com) who also kindly contributed a previous piece on the tanker selection.

Tanker Travails Part II, A Way Out of the Swamp

In the aftermath of last weeks ruling by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) virtually all pundits and observers agree that the report is unprecedented in its scathing tone and for the extent and number of errors uncovered in the audit.  I, like many others, am trying to figure out two things.   One, how did the Air Force botch this so badly?  Two, where is this going from here?

This Can’t Be Happening, Can It?

As to the first, I wanted to give the USAF the benefit of the doubt given the high stakes and complexity of the deal.  But the GAO’s seven findings leave me shaking my head in utter bafflement!  Seldom has such scathing language been used to criticize a procurement selection.  One must ask:  if this is just the surface, what lies beneath?  I am particularly troubled by the statement that “The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing….”  Why?  To what end?  The list of errors read like a “how-not-to-evaluate-a-proposal” tutorial!  Did the Boeing tanker actually win the contest, given the conditions of the RFP?

Images all courtesy of Boeing

This decision couldn’t come at a worse time for the Air Force.  It just lost its two highest officials, the Secretary and Chief of Staff, due to unbelievable failures in accounting for nuclear weapons and nuclear parts.  We also learned of serious disagreements over the budget, particularly the F-22 Raptor; the Air Force wants more, but DOD does not.  The same goes for other weapons programs, like the C-17.  This is a “house divided” and does not serve our nation, nor the men and women whose lives are entrusted to the Air Force’s leaders.  This very public internecine squabbling would be bad enough in peace time; in time of war, it has no place.  As a minimum, I suggest the USAF “stand down” for one day and watch “Twelve O’Clock High”.  We could use a few General Frank Savages now; not more MBA managerial types.  The Air Force needs leaders.

Which leads me to the answer to the first question, how did they botch this so badly?  Answer, senior leadership failure.  The bad news is that the process by which the Air Force selects major weapons systems is broke.  The good news is that it can be fixed by a LEADER who will be uncompromising in enforcing standards.  Fortunately, Secretary Gates seems to have found the right man, General Norton Schwartz, a special ops guy who will bring a warrior’s mind set to bear on the problems.

How Do We Clean Up This Mess?

The tanker saga has been dragging on for eight years now.  To put that in perspective, that is twice the length the America’s involvement in World War II.  The Air Force acquisition branch has had enough time and enough chances to bring this to closure, but can’t.  Frankly, the blame is not all theirs either.  The stakes here are just too high and the ramifications of this decision too far reaching to be made within the narrow confines of “technical merit” alone.

Both the KC-767 and the KC-30 can do the job.  At first glance it would appear that the bigger aircraft brings “more” to the table.  However, given the points made by Boeing with respect to operational flexibility, survivability, and cost, it appears that “more” could be applied to either contender.

Why can’t DOD consider the implications for the U.S. aerospace industry?  Why can’t we consider the implications of foreign control, particularly when dealing with a company in which our great “friends”, the Russians own five percent?  Why can’t we consider massive economic dislocation which would occur in several  regions of the country, particularly the loss of highly skilled jobs?  Why should we allow taxpayer dollars to be used to fund a plant in our back yard for an already subsidized competitor to our largest exporter?  Especially now when that competitor is struggling with so many financial, legal, and ethical issues of their own?

These questions go to the very heart of the tanker issue.  It’s not just about a flying gas station, pallets carried, or MTOW,  but there are a host of strategic considerations that will have long term implications on our nation’s capability to provide our armed forces the tools they require to do their job.  Can you imagine having the State Department involved in persuading a future president of a European country on why they should not embargo parts as part of a mission planning scenario?  I can’t.

Neither the Air Force, nor the Department of Defense, is currently empowered to fully consider these factors and act upon them.  This is the job of the U.S. Congress.  Before one accuses me of being “biased” and “protectionist”, let me confess that when it comes to the preservation of our indigenous defense infrastructure, I am.  But I’m not alone.  There’s that Galileo satellite project in Europe to use as a counter example.

What about a split buy of both the KC-767 and KC-30?  That would be too expensive and for what?  To give a competitor the “political cover” they need to convince their politicians and unions that they “just have to” build this factory in the U.S.?  Rather than do that, why not give Northrop-Grumman a share in the KC-767 program?  That would be expensive, too, but there would be no dollar repatriation and Mobile, Alabama, would get those coveted aerospace jobs.  Boeing might just have a use for all the extra capacity that would free up?

The most sensible course of action is for Congress to direct a sole source purchase of the KC-767 post haste.  The USAF has been insistent on the urgency of this procurement (now compounded by eight years of delays).  A new RFP would be another invitation into the swamp of politics and bickering.  A “fly-off” would be inviting more delays and prove what, that both planes can do the job?  We know that already.   Any re-evaluation of the existing RFP would be tainted by the events of the recent past and would likely end up in Federal Claims court.  Ironically, it was a member of the U.S. Senate who insisted on “open and fair” competition, which brought about this mess.  Perhaps that Senator would stand to gain by taking this issue off the table, considering the other job for which he is now applying?

Our Air Force does not need this distraction.  End it.  If the needs of the War Fighter are truly paramount here, prove it.  Sole source it for Boeing.  Now!

29 comments June 23rd, 2008