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Since the Dubai Air Show, the lack of sizeable orders attained or won by Boeing has come under scrutiny again by some of its more fiercest critics.Critics, I might add, who still play the “orders game” and fail to accept Boeing’s oft-stated position that it is their customers, not Boeing, which makes known their orders and that it doesn’t “stock up” on announcements like Airbus does for the sake of media glare.

With large focus on the Emirates order for upto 120 Airbus A350’s, an equally large focus swayed straight over to the 787-10, the as of yet, unlaunched fourth model within the fastest selling airplane family, the 787 Dreamliner.

Image courtesy of Boeing

In a nutshell, what does this campaign loss at Emirates mean for the 787-10’s future?

“We’re within a few months of defining the centre of the market,” Scott Carson said in an interview at the Dubai Air Show.

“We’ve been working for two years to find out what the (bigger) 787-10 wants to be.”

“There are six to eight (sales) campaigns around the world (for the planned stretched 787-10) and each one wants a different thing,” Carson said, adding that customers were looking for about 200 planes.

Carson also pointed out that feedback from customers varied greatly, with some potential customers with a desire to see 425 seats being able to fly roughly 5,000 miles, while other customers want a 380 seater model that can fly 7,500 miles or beyond.

Therein lies (part of) the dilemma about the proposed 787-10. The other (and widely unreported) ingredient into this mix is the Airbus A350-1000 itself.

With a paltry 40 orders for an airplane marketed over three years ago and allegedly destined to supplant and make obsolete the successful 777-300ER, Airbus has thus far refused to publically acknowledge a major problem both Qatar Airways and Emirates have known for months.

Range.

It’s an issue for Airbus to come clean about, not least because of financial difficulties and a cost cutting project in Power8 that remains largely stagnant.

Publically, Airbus maintains that the 14,800km (8,000nm) range of the 350 seat (tri-class) A350-1000 will be met - behind the scenes, even once vocal proponents like Qantas know that the airplane is struggling to meet that range target.

One airline source states that the jet is missing the range target by over 500nm.

Just as the A380 was reclassified a 525-seat jet, there rumors within Emirates (and likely Airbus itself) that the A350-1000 seat count may well drop to facilitate/trade into a slight increase in range. If that happens, the assertion that the A350-1000 is somehow a natural successor for the 777-300ER will no longer stand true. Not from a true tri-class seating arrangement anyway.

Image copyrighted and owned by BOEING777 and FleetBuzz.com

So what does that mean then for the undefined 787-10?

The Y3 concept incorporating and eventual 777/747 replacement is possibly 5-7 years away - depending on when Boeing decides to launch its 737RS and the resources required to facilitate its development.

For now, getting the 787-8 into the air is a priority. Not least because it will form the groundwork for the -9, -3 and -10 variants.

Boeing would likely prefer to optimize the 787-10 at around 320 seats. This allows operators of the 777-200/ER/LR and A330-200/-300 families to replace these jets with a similar sized 787. Emirates complained that the 787-9 wasn’t big enough, yet did not order the A350-1000 in sizeable numbers as it has done with the 777-300ER.

Instead, it chose to order more 777-300ER’s.

A very telling statement despite some quarters claiming that the type will be rendered “obsolete” by something that is clearly not a “like-for-like” replacement.

That in itself is a tell tale sign that the A350-1000 is clearly not yet at the stage to be considered a true like-for-like 777-300ER replacement. Peruse the image below taken from one of Randy Tinseth’s presentations:

The A350-1000 cannot match the 442 seats Emirates operates on the large Boeing twin with 10 abreast seating - (another area the A350 family as a whole cannot emulate) unless it uses awfully more cramped seating, resulting in narrower aisles - requiring a redesign of food carts and more stringent evacuation tests.

Doesn’t quite look “extra wide body” now does it?

Most people though, are smart enough to see through the misguided marketing Airbus uses - this isn’t the first occurence and it’s unlikely to be the last. Four engines for long haul?

As time goes on, the view that the A350-1000 will be that 777-300ER “killer” will shift to make obsolete the 777-200ER family.

This strategy is two-fold:

Firstly, the 777-200ER family will be approaching 20 years of age. Those customers who have not ordered or are toward the rear of the 787 queue will be unable to replace these 777’s fast enough and/or may even turn to the A350-900. In short, the A350 family, despite being six years behind the 787, brings no new technology to the marketplace and is targetting a completely different segment - albeit saturated.

Customers taking A330 or 777 deliveries today are unlikely to swap to A350’s just because Airbus is building them.

Airplanes are a 15-20 year investment - and unless oil prices triple from today’s levels and the A350 proves to be the green camps most environmentally friendly airplane, airlines will not be dumping en masse to acquire the big Airbus twin just yet.

Secondly, Airbus has been forced into selecting the second best method for composite fuselage construction due to the patents held by Boeing on the monolithic method, including processes.

Most 777-200/-200ER/-200LR operators have configurations of less than 305 seats in a variety of cabin classes - equally, the A350-900 will seldom find an operator with a tricked out jet at 314 seats. For the sake of legroom and range, most A350-900’s will cater anywhere between 240-280 seats.

Boeing then, is likely to place the 787-10 between the A350-900 and A350-1000, leaving a 777-300ER/747-8 replacement to an all new widebody toward the end of the next decade.

Just as the A350-1000 will not be fully laden with 350 seats, Boeing will study and place its 787-10 to counter the Airbus jet, which is not due to enter service until later next decade. This move spells potential trouble for Airbus, as such a 787-10 would have at least a 4 year headstart if EIS is slated for 2013. The reality however, is while Boeing is ironing out production issues on the current 787 lineup, the 787-10 may not see service entry until mid 2014 or even beyond.

As per my interview with Randy Tinseth in Dubai, Boeing has time on its hands to deliberate what it should/not do.

Image courtesy of Boeing

Naturally, the 777-300ER is not going to be around forever, but deploying this strategy pits the 787-10 dead against the A350-1000.

A 787-10 with 320-seats (tri class) is the preferred option for at least a half dozen carriers I have spoken to. Of these airlines, four are already 787 customers, the other two are European airlines.

Such a model would retain commonality with the existing 787 lineup - albeit as with the growth variants of the 777, the technical characteristics will alter. In will come the 6-wheeled bogie landing gear, already earmarked extended range variants of the 787-9 and wing/spar/fuselage strengthening to accomodate the extra passengers, freight and fuel.

This does not however, rule out the possibility that an entirely new wing could be developed.

Range on such a potential 69m/70m length 787-10 would be estimated at around 7,500nm.

Given that the 787-10 will likely be the second and final stretch of the Dreamliner, it is likely Boeing will try to retain the existing wing rather than develop a new one to be used solely on one airplane to keep costs and prices as low and attractive as possible. It’s a critical issue for both customers and plane maker alike - and one that has to be right.

Afterall, its taken Airbus 17 years to address the 777 family with the A350XWB.

That sort of lead time incorporating design after redesign is not what airlines are accustomed to and is part of the reason why Airbus’ failure to see twinjet airplanes as the future of long haul travel has cost the A340 family an early grave.

Now, it has (reluctantly) joined up the very segment it vilified with it’s irresponsible scaremongering that two engines were somehow less safer than quads in an attempt to shift more A340’s and A380’s.

For Boeing, Y3 then, could evolve into a 320-seat plus airplane to supplant the 777-300ER and 747-8 families, but Boeing already has a full plate to juggle - the 787, 777-200F, 747-8F, 747-8I and talks of a new 737 model too.

Y3 will be discussed in another piece.

Airbus too has a full meal to digest - not least because of the ageing, but popular A320 family backlog, A330-200F, A350XWB family and future A380 projects like the extended range A380-800R and stretched A380-900.

Image courtesy of CamSim

For the interim, Emirates may yet opt for the 787-10 as a neat 300 seat, tri-class jet wedged in between its A350-900 and A350-1000 airplanes.

When Boeing stretched the 777-200, the 777-300 was a relatively straightforward stretch but as with the 747-300, its sales potential was never realized once the 777-300ER left the table. Boeing is likely this time around to push for a longer range, high gross weight 787-10 from the outset.

The double stretch 767-400ER, while a cheap enough derivative, found few customers because of its inability to match the A330-200 on range and freight capability. Optimizing the 787-10 to avoid previous “pitfalls” is ultimately going to define how the airplane evolves.

No decision has yet been made to formally offer the model, but a mooted 2013 service entry would likely mean 2010 as being the year for its formal industrial launch. That’s still a long way off.

Image courtesy of Airbus

Critically, the development of the large Airbus twin will end up dictating what Boeing does/not do on the 787-10.

After years of procrastinating over the A350, the big challenge for the European manufacturer is to build, test and certify on budget and on time.

Customers are all too wary of the A380 delays and will loathe to be in the same quagmire again, let alone Airbus shelling out larges sums of compensation in return.

John Leahy made the foolish assumption that somehow payments in lieu of performance shortfalls would placate customers - most notably on the failed A340 family, whose newer -500/-600 models developed with low fuel prices in mind are being dropped quicker than lead weights in water as fuel bills rise and efficiency takes command.

You have to ask then, if Airbus did not see the 787 as a threat, would they have bothered to move on the rehashed A330/A350, much less the A350XWB?

Unlikely.

The revamp of the A350 itself has yielded limited success - but nothing to the extent some would have us believe.

The A350-900 has by far and away been the better seller of the range - albeit if you look across the customer base, many of the airlines are either Government owned or backed - not a bad thing per se, but it is still devoid of a broad spectrum of customers like the 787.

Perhaps Scott Carson was right in the program update this week when he says that the Dreamliner is the right airplane for the market?

As it stands, the A350-900 (can be and) is “all things” for all customers - one only need to go back to ILFC head honcho Stephen Udvar-Hazy and what he said about Airbus and being able to deliver on the A350 program.

“Look, Airbus, you’ve got six years to get your act together. When you’ve built this airplane, if you come up 2%, 3%, 4% short—we hope you don’t, but if you do—you will have to write us a check every month for the shortfall.

…Airbus can’t refuse that type of a commitment, otherwise it can’t sell the airplane. Because now there’s a benchmark called the 787.“

“If the A350 can only offer the old engine, no matter how good it is, Airbus will be at a serious competitive disadvantage. And it is having difficulty publicly admitting that.“

With the 777-300ER snarling up the majority of sales from the 777-200ER/-200LR, Airbus seems to have addressed this portion well with the A350-900 - but the airplane is still 6 years away - like the 787, it has to promise and deliver on time.

Investor confidence in EADS/Airbus is far lower than that of Boeing - Airbus’ credibility is in tatters over the A380 delays and the ongoing investigation into stock selling. It has almost no margin for error on the A350. Any slippage to the already costly $16bn project will damage the A350 beyond repair.

Analysts predict over 700 frames have to be sold to get anywhere close to breakeven - but that is based on list price.

The way the A350 has been sold with stunning 50%+ discounts at Emirates and Qatar Airways (both of whom hold the bulk of the orders for the A350 family) suggests like the A380, breakeven is unlikely to be attained, if at all - regardless of the number of airframes sold.

Like the A350, the undefined 787-10 is not without a major headache.

Engines.

Rolls Royce has the capacity to push the Trent 1000 for all current and proposed 787 models, yet those customers who have selected the GEnx will likely see the very same problem the A350-1000 customers have. GE has thus far avoided powering the big Airbus twin so as not to erode sales of the 777-200LR/-300ER.

Image courtesy of Volvo Aero

The 787-10 would likely require a 90-93,000lbs thrust engine- which is currently only attainable by the Trent 1000, although the rival GEnx has been run at 85,000lbs. GE has avoided an all new engine, but the customer and Boeing push to get the 787-10 into being may force GE to re-evaluate its reluctance to power the A350-1000.

With the A350-1000 not scheduled to enter service until late 2015, both Airbus and Boeing have adequate time on their hands to refine and define their respective big twins.

Image courtesy of Boeing

Unlike the chasm that exists between the 777 and A340 families, the gap (if any) between the 787 and A350XWB will be smaller.

For the eventual 777/747 replacement, Y3 will/could be placed above the 787-10 upto a potential 460 seat tri-class jet that could even see the first 11 abreast seating arrangement (unless Emirates introduces it first on its high density Airbus A380-800’s!)

Boeing already has patents in place for such a large airplane using the same 787 styled monolithic composite structure, leaving Airbus to press on with what essentially amounts to a second best composite panel alternative.

In one aspect of this embodiment, the structural panels 210 are operably coupled together to form an exterior portion of the fuselage 202 adjacent to an interior portion 204. The interior portion 204 can include a passenger cabin configured to hold a plurality of passenger seats 206 ranging in number from about 50 to about 700 seats, e.g., from about 100 to about 600 seats. In another aspect of this embodiment, the structural panels 210 can be composed largely of metallic materials such as aluminum, titanium, and/or steel. In other embodiments, the structural panels 210 can include one or more composite materials, such as graphite-epoxy materials.

Regardless of what transpires, the next couple of years will be crucial to both major rivals, as they periodically peer at one another to make a more competitive and attractive family of airplanes. 2008 will be delicately poised for both the 787 and A350.

The 787 will take to the air and the A350 approaches design freeze. It’s a tender time for both projects.

Neither one can afford the luxury of a slippage.

30 comments December 13th, 2007